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O P I N I O N  
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Under the South Pacific Tuna Treaty (“SPTT”), a 
limited number of licenses to fish the tuna-rich waters of the 
Pacific Island nations are available to vessels under the 
control and command of U.S. citizens. Moore & Company, 
P.A. (“Moore”), a law firm, commenced this False Claims 
Act (“FCA”) action against Korean nationals and LLCs 
formed by them, alleging that the LLCs acquired two of these 
SPTT licenses by fraudulently certifying to the U.S. 
government that they were controlled by U.S. citizens and 
that their fishing vessels were commanded by U.S. captains. 
Moore first learned of this alleged fraud through discovery in 
a wrongful death action that it litigated in federal court 
against two of the defendants in this case. The issue before us 
is whether the District Court, in dismissing Moore’s action, 
properly interpreted the FCA’s public disclosure bar and its 
“original source” exception, particularly the 2010 
amendments to these provisions.   
 
 The FCA empowers a person, or “relator,” to sue on 
behalf of the United States those who defraud the 
government, and to share in any ultimate recovery.1 But the 
FCA’s public disclosure bar forecloses a relator’s action 
when the alleged fraud has been publicly disclosed in at least 
                                              
1 This type of action is commonly referred to as a qui tam 
suit. 
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one of several enumerated sources—unless the relator is an 
original source of certain information underlying the action.  
 
 In 2010, Congress amended the public disclosure bar 
as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“PPACA”). In doing so, it removed the language that 
explicitly stated that a court was deprived of “jurisdiction” 
over the FCA action if the bar applied to that action; reduced 
the number of enumerated public disclosure sources; and 
expanded the definition of “original source” by allowing a 
relator who “materially adds” to the publicly disclosed 
information to qualify.  
 
 Each of these three changes is implicated in this case, 
as Moore argues that the District Court erred by (1) 
construing the amended bar as a jurisdictional limitation, so 
that it improperly dismissed the action under Rule 12(b)(1) 
rather than Rule 12(b)(6); (2) ruling that the allegations or 
transactions of the alleged fraud were publicly disclosed; and 
(3) concluding that Moore was not an original source. We 
agree that the public disclosure bar is no longer jurisdictional 
and that the motion therefore should have been decided under 
Rule 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(b)(1). We further conclude 
that the alleged fraud was publicly disclosed, but that Moore 
was nevertheless an original source of information underlying 
the action.  
 
 At issue on appeal is not whether Moore has alleged an 
actionable fraud.2 Rather, what is contested is whether the 
                                              
2 In addition to moving under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the defendants moved 
under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint as not alleging 
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alleged fraud was disclosed through any of the qualifying 
public disclosure sources, and if so, whether Moore has 
materially added to those public disclosures by contributing 
details of the alleged fraud that it independently uncovered 
through discovery in the wrongful death action in federal 
court. The answers to these questions turn on how we apply 
the public disclosure bar as amended by the PPACA. We will 
begin with a discussion of the significance of the bar’s new 
provisions.  
 
I. The 2010 Amendments to the FCA’s Public 
Disclosure Bar  
 
 The FCA is a relic of the Civil War, but its public 
disclosure bar was engrafted on the Act more recently. The 
original FCA did not require a relator to possess firsthand 
knowledge of a previously unknown fraud. As a result, in the 
early 1940s, some enterprising individuals filed FCA actions 
based not on their own independent knowledge of a fraud but 
on information revealed in the government’s criminal 
indictments. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 10–11 (1986). To 
counteract these “parasitic lawsuits,” Congress added a 
provision in 1943 that denied jurisdiction over FCA actions 
that were “based upon evidence or information in the 
possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or 
employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought.” 31 
U.S.C. § 232(C) (1946). But this “government knowledge 
defense” did not just eradicate the parasitic lawsuits; it 
                                                                                                     
an actionable fraud. The District Court, however, did not 
reach this issue, as it granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion based on the public disclosure bar.   
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eliminated most FCA lawsuits, for courts strictly interpreted § 
232(C) as barring FCA actions even when the government 
knew of the fraud only because the relator had reported it. See 
United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 
105 F.3d 675, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1997)  (“[B]y restricting qui tam 
suits by individuals who brought fraudulent activity to the 
government’s attention, Congress had killed the goose that 
laid the golden egg and eliminated the financial incentive to 
expose fraud against the government.”).  
 
 Against this backdrop, Congress amended the FCA in 
1986, replacing the government knowledge defense with the 
less restrictive public disclosure bar. This bar precluded a 
relator from bringing an action that was based on allegations 
or transactions of fraud that had been publicly disclosed in 
certain enumerated sources, but added an exception if the 
relator was an “original source” of the information underlying 
the action:   
 
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an 
action under this section based upon the public 
disclosure of allegations or transactions in [i] a 
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, [ii] in 
a congressional, administrative, or Government 
Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or 
investigation, or [iii] from the news media, 
unless the action is brought by the Attorney 
General or the person bringing the action is an 
original source of the information. 
 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006). An “original source” was 
defined as “an individual who has direct and independent 
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are 
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based and has voluntarily provided the information to the 
Government before filing an action under this section which 
is based on the information.” Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).  
 
 Although the original public disclosure bar was less 
restrictive than the government knowledge defense, it was by 
no means a low bar for relators to clear. Indeed, given its 
broad language, as well as different courts’ varying 
interpretations of that language, relators faced a formidable 
hurdle.  
 
 In 2010, Congress amended the bar as part of the 
PPACA so that it now reads as follows: 
 
(4)(A) The court shall dismiss an action or 
claim under this section, unless opposed by the 
Government, if substantially the same 
allegations or transactions as alleged in the 
action or claim were publicly disclosed— 
 
(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or 
administrative hearing in which the 
Government or its agent is a party; 
 
(ii) in a congressional, Government 
Accountability Office, or other Federal 
report, hearing, audit or investigation; or 
 
(iii) from the news media, 
unless the action is brought by the Attorney 
General or the person bringing the action is 
an original source of the information. 
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(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original 
source” means an individual who either (i) prior 
to a public disclosure under subsection 
(e)(4)(A), has voluntarily disclosed to the 
Government the information on which 
allegations or transactions in a claim are based, 
or (2) who has knowledge that is independent of 
and materially adds to the publicly disclosed 
allegations or transactions, and who has 
voluntarily provided the information to the 
Government before filing an action under this 
section. 
 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A), (B) (2012) (emphases 
added).  
 
 The italicized language has radically changed the 
“hurdle” for relators. First, the bar’s preliminary language no 
longer explicitly states that a court is deprived of 
“jurisdiction” over the FCA action if the bar applies. 
Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) (“No court shall 
have jurisdiction over an action under this section . . . .”), with 
id. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012) (“The court shall dismiss an action 
or claim under this section, unless opposed by the 
Government . . . .”). Second, information that was disclosed 
in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing now qualifies as 
a public disclosure only if the information was disclosed in a 
federal case to which the government was a party. Compare 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) (listing a “criminal, civil, 
or administrative hearing” as a public disclosure source), with 
id. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(i) (2012) (listing “a Federal criminal, 
civil, or administrative hearing in which the Government or 
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its agent is a party” as a public disclosure source). As a result, 
information that was disclosed in a federal case between 
private parties no longer constitutes publicly disclosed 
information.   
 
 Lastly, Congress expanded the definition of “original 
source” in § 3730(e)(4)(B). The salient question is no longer 
whether the relator has “direct and independent knowledge” 
of the information on which the allegations in the complaint 
are based. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2006). Rather, original 
source status now turns on whether the relator has 
“knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the 
publicly disclosed allegations or transactions.” Id. § 
3730(e)(4)(B) (2012). Significantly, a relator no longer must 
possess “direct . . . knowledge” of the fraud to qualify as an 
original source. See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, 
Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 
1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding under the pre-PPACA bar 
that a law-firm relator lacked direct knowledge because it had 
learned of the fraud “through two intermediaries,” one of 
which was “the discovery procedure by which the 
memoranda [exposing the alleged fraud] were produced”). 
The focus now is on what independent knowledge the relator 
has added to what was publicly disclosed.    
 
 In short, with its 2010 amendments, Congress 
overhauled the public disclosure bar. Although no direct 
legislative history seems to exist, the textual changes alone 
evince Congress’s intent to lower the bar for relators, at least 
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as to some of its components. With these changes in mind, we 
turn to the issues presented in this case.3   
 
 II. Nonjurisdictional Character of the Amended Public 
Disclosure Bar 
 
 We first address Moore’s contention that, by virtue of 
Congress’s change to the bar’s preliminary language, the 
District Court should have decided the case under Rule 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim rather than under Rule 
12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction.4 While the pre-PPACA bar 
stated that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action 
under this section based upon the public disclosure of 
allegations or transactions [in certain enumerated sources],” 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006), the post-PPACA bar states 
that “[t]he court shall dismiss an action or claim under this 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review 
de novo the District Court’s decision on a motion to dismiss. 
McTernan v. City of York, Penn., 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 
2009).   
4 In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction, “the court may [usually] consider and weigh 
evidence outside the pleadings to determine if it has 
jurisdiction,” and “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of persuasion 
to convince the court it has jurisdiction.” Gould Electronics 
Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000). By 
contrast, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, a court generally considers only the 
allegations in the complaint, accepting them as true, and the 
defendant bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff has 
not stated a claim. Id.         
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section, unless opposed by the Government, if substantially 
the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or 
claim were publicly disclosed [in certain enumerated 
sources],” id. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012). With little analysis, the 
District Court declared that this amended provision, like its 
predecessor, presented a jurisdictional bar. We disagree and 
join the other circuits that have ruled that the amended 
version does not set forth a jurisdictional bar. See United 
States ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 810 
(11th Cir. 2015) (“We conclude that the amended 
§ 3730(e)(4) creates grounds for dismissal for failure to state 
a claim rather than for lack of jurisdiction.”); United States ex 
rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908, 916 (4th Cir. 
2013) (“It is apparent . . . that the public-disclosure bar is no 
longer jurisdictional.”).   
 
 As our sister circuits have reasoned, first, the amended 
bar makes no mention of jurisdiction, and unless Congress 
has “‘clearly state[d]’ that the [statutory limitation] is 
jurisdictional . . ., ‘courts should treat the restriction as 
nonjurisdictional in character.’” Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l 
Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y 
& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006)). Second, in 
amending the bar, Congress removed the jurisdictional 
language that prohibited a court from entertaining the suit if 
the public disclosure bar applied. See Brewster v. Gage, 280 
U.S. 327, 337 (1930) (“The deliberate selection of language 
so differing from that used in the earlier acts indicates that a 
change of law was intended.”). Third, Congress left 
undisturbed similar jurisdictional language in neighboring 
provisions. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1) (2012) (“No 
court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought by a 
former or present member of the armed services under 
12 
 
subsection (b) of this section against a member of the armed 
forces arising out of such person’s service in the armed 
forces.”). Finally, if a court holds that a relator’s claim is 
publically disclosed, the amended bar nonetheless permits the 
government to oppose the court’s dismissal of the action, an 
option that effectively dispels any notion that the bar is still 
jurisdictional. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 
(2012) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or 
forfeited.”). 
 
 For these reasons, we conclude that the amended bar is 
not jurisdictional. Accordingly, the District Court should have 
decided the defendants’ motion to dismiss on public 
disclosure grounds under Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1).   
 
III. Public Disclosure  
 We next address whether the fraud alleged by Moore 
was publicly disclosed. Moore brought this FCA action 
against Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC; Pacific Breeze 
Fisheries, LLC; and Joyce Jungmi Kim, alleging they 
defrauded the government in that, in order to procure the 
SPTT fishing licenses, the LLCs fraudulently certified to the 
U.S. Coast Guard that they were controlled by U.S. citizens 
and that their eponymous fishing vessels (“F/V Majestic 
Blue” and “F/V Pacific Breeze”) were commanded by U.S. 
captains.5 According to Moore, the LLCs, in fact, were 
controlled by Dongwon Industries, a South Korean tuna 
company, and their vessels, F/V Majestic Blue and F/V 
                                              
5 Moore also brought this action against Dongwon Industries 
Co., Ltd., Jayne Songmi Kim, and Jaewoong Kim, but they 
were never served and have not entered appearances.   
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Pacific Breeze, were commanded by Korean fishing masters 
who worked for Dongwon.6    
 
 We must decide whether “substantially the same 
allegations or transactions [of fraud] as alleged in [Moore’s] 
action or claim were publicly disclosed” in any of the 
enumerated public disclosure sources. 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(e)(4)(A) (2012). We first consider whether the sources 
on which the defendants rely in arguing that the alleged fraud 
was publicly disclosed qualify as public disclosure sources 
under § 3730(e)(4)(A). We next determine whether 
“substantially the same allegations or transactions” of fraud 
alleged by Moore were publicly disclosed through these 
qualifying sources. Id.  
 
 As stated earlier, to be publicly disclosed, the alleged 
fraud must have been revealed through at least one of three 
sources: (1) “a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative 
hearing in which the Government or its agent is a party”; (2) 
“a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other 
Federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation”; or (3) “news 
media.” Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(i)–(iii). Here, the defendants 
argue, as they did in the District Court, that the alleged fraud 
was publicly disclosed in “news media” and “Federal 
report[s].”  
 
 As “news media,” the defendants proffered a mixture 
of two Internet news articles, a podcast, and a blog, but the 
                                              
6 To obtain an SPTT license, a vessel must be granted a U.S. 
Coast Guard certificate of documentation. This certificate is 
available only to vessels that are under the control and 
command of U.S. citizens. 
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District Court concluded that only the two news articles 
qualified. The first article, “Flogging and Mutiny in the 21st 
Century, Proudly Waving the Stars and Stripes,” which was 
posted on maritimeaccident.org, describes the experience of 
Doug Pine, an American who had served as a “captain” of the 
F/V Majestic Blue (“Maritime Accident article”). (App. 726.) 
The second, “Coast Guard Probes Island Mariner’s Account 
of Fiasco at Sea,” which was posted on 
vashonbeachcomber.com, also describes Pine’s experience 
aboard the F/V Majestic Blue (“Vashon Beachcomber 
article”). (App. 731.) Moore concedes that these two articles 
qualify as “news media.”7 
                                              
7 On appeal, the defendants argue that the District Court erred 
in deciding that the podcast and the blog did not qualify as 
news media. The podcast was an interview with Doug Pine, 
and the blog consisted mostly of posted “Responses” by 
various individuals to Pine’s story about his experience on the 
F/V Majestic Blue. We need not address whether these 
sources qualify as news media because we conclude that the 
alleged fraud was publicly disclosed through the two news 
articles and the documents obtained by Moore through 
Freedom of Information Act requests.   
 
 We also recognize that the defendants attached the two 
news articles to their motion to dismiss, and that because 
these articles were not attached to Moore’s complaint, a court 
would not usually consider such evidence in deciding a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. Moore, however, has conceded that these 
news articles qualify as news media and has not challenged 
their authenticity, and so we will judicially notice them for 
the limited purpose of determining “what was in the public 
realm at the time, not whether the contents of those articles 
15 
 
 
 The District Court also decided that certain 
information that Moore had obtained through Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) requests constituted “Federal 
report[s].” This information included the LLCs’ allegedly 
fraudulent certifications to the U.S. Coast Guard that they 
were controlled by U.S. citizens and that their vessels, F/V 
Majestic Blue and F/V Pacific Breeze, were commanded by 
U.S. captains, as well as certain emails sent by a man named 
“K.Y. Hwang” of “Dongwon Industries.”8 (App. 608.)    
 
 In deciding that these FOIA documents constituted 
federal reports, the District Court relied on Schindler Elevator 
Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401 (2011). 
There, the Court analyzed whether FOIA documents 
constitute “report[s]” under the pre-PPACA bar and decided 
that “[a] written agency response to a FOIA request falls 
within the ordinary meaning of ‘report,’” and that “[a]ny 
records the agency produces along with its written FOIA 
response are part of that response.” Id. at 410–11. The District 
Court concluded that Schindler’s interpretation of “report” in 
the pre-PPACA bar applied with equal force to the post-
PPACA bar because a “report” is also a public disclosure 
source in the post-PPACA bar. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) (listing “a congressional, 
administrative, or Government Accounting office report” as a 
public disclosure source (emphasis added)), with id. § 
3730(e)(4)(A)(ii) (2012) (listing “a congressional, 
                                                                                                     
were in fact true.” Benak ex rel. Alliance Premier Growth 
Fund v. Appliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 435 F.3d 396, 401 
n.15 (3d Cir. 2006). 
8 Moore attached this information to its complaint.  
16 
 
Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report” 
as a public disclosure source (emphasis added)).  
 While Moore recognizes that a government “report” is 
also a public disclosure source in the post-PPACA bar, it 
contends that the Court’s interpretation of that word in 
Schindler does not apply to the post-PPACA bar because the 
pre-PPACA bar is “a much different statute.” (Moore’s Br. 
26.) It further urges us to follow the “guiding philosophy” 
behind the 2010 amendments to the public disclosure bar, 
which, it asserts, is that the bar applies only when federal 
officials are likely to see the public disclosures. (Id.)  
 
 We reject Moore’s argument. The PPACA did not alter 
the bar in any way that would render Schindler’s 
interpretation of “report” inapplicable to the FOIA documents 
under consideration here. Moreover, even before Schindler 
was decided, many courts, including our own, had similarly 
interpreted “report” in the pre-PPACA bar. See, e.g., United 
States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 
F.3d 376, 383 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that FOIA 
documents “fell within the ordinary meaning of the term 
‘report’”); United States ex rel. Grynberg v. Praxair, Inc., 
389 F.3d 1038, 1051 (10th Cir. 2004) (“It is generally 
accepted that a response to a request under the FOIA is a 
public disclosure.”). When Congress overhauled the bar in 
2010, it could have reacted to these cases by excluding FOIA 
documents as “report[s].” Cf. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 
559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010) (“We normally assume that, when 
Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of relevant judicial 
precedent.”). But it did not: it left “report” largely unaltered 
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as a public disclosure source.9 Congress thus did not amend 
this source in any way that would cast doubt on the view held 
by many courts that a “report” includes FOIA documents, a 
view later confirmed by the Court in Schindler. 
 
 In addition, Moore’s “guiding philosophy” argument 
rings hollow when we consider that § 3730(e)(4)(A) includes 
many documents that the government will likely never see. 
For example, “news media” is a source that “include[s] a 
large number of local newspapers and radio stations” and 
therefore “likely describes a multitude of sources that would 
seldom come to the attention of the Attorney General.” 
Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 300 (2010).  
 
 We next consider whether substantially the same 
“allegations or transactions” of fraud alleged by Moore were 
publicly disclosed via the two news articles and the FOIA 
documents. “An allegation of fraud is an explicit accusation 
of wrongdoing. A transaction warranting an inference of 
fraud is one that is composed of a misrepresented state of 
facts plus the actual state of facts.” United States ex rel. Zizic 
v. Q2Administrators, LLC, 728 F.3d 228, 235–36 (3d Cir. 
2013). Formulaically this appears as follows: “X 
(misrepresented state of facts) + Y (true state of facts) = Z 
(fraud).” United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. Cty. of Del., 123 
F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 1997). A defendant must therefore 
show that substantially the same “allegation[]” of fraud (Z) or 
“transaction[]” of fraud (X + Y) was publicly disclosed 
through the sources enumerated in § 3730(e)(4)(A).     
                                              
9 Congress did amend this source so that only “Federal” 
reports qualify. The FOIA is, of course, a federal statute.   
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 Here, Moore’s “allegation” of fraud (Z) is that the 
defendants fraudulently procured certificates of 
documentation from the U.S. Coast Guard so that they could 
obtain the SPTT fishing licenses. As for the “transaction” of 
that fraud, it alleges that the defendants certified to the U.S. 
Coast Guard that U.S. citizens controlled the LLCs and 
commanded their vessels (the mispresented state of facts, or 
X) when in fact Dongwon both controlled the LLCs and 
commanded their vessels (the true state of facts, or Y). The 
defendants have shown that substantially this same 
“transaction” was publicly disclosed. 
 
 In the applications for certificates of documentation 
that the LLCs filed with the U.S. Coast Guard and that were 
obtained by Moore through FOIA requests, Majestic Blue 
LLC and Pacific Breeze LLC certified that “non-citizens do 
not have authority within a management group, whether 
through veto power, combined voting, or otherwise, to 
exercise control over the LLC[s],” and that their eponymous 
fishing vessels “will at all times remain under the command 
of a U.S. citizen.” (App. 233–34, 236–37.)  
 
 However, the two news articles indicate that Majestic 
Blue LLC is not controlled by U.S. citizens, nor is its vessel 
commanded by a U.S. captain. The Vashon Beachcomber 
article describes how Doug Pine accepted a position on the 
F/V Majestic Blue “as captain of the Korean-managed ship,” 
states that the F/V Majestic Blue is “operated by a Korean 
company,” and even names that company as “Korea’s 
Dongwon Corporation.” (App. 731.) The Maritime Accident 
article reveals how the Korean fishing master, not Captain 
Pine, commanded the vessel: 
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When the [F/V Majestic Blue] was registered in 
the US, the Korean captain became the 
fishmaster and Captain Pine joined as Captain. 
It was an uncomfortable relationship.   
. . . . 
 Pine found it difficult to exercise his 
authority almost from the moment he first 
boarded the vessel: “The first day I was aboard 
I asked for the crew list[.] It was ordered by 
rank. I was Number Two, the fishmaster was 
number 1. The second officer refused a direct 
order to change it. The Korean officers refused 
to obey any routine command activity. 
 
 In fact, Pine was supposed to simply be a 
“paper captain” to meet the requirements of the 
US flag and to accept the authority of the 
fishmaster, the former captain. Pine was unable 
to manoeuver the vessel or use the navigation 
equipment on the bridge.     
 
(App. 726.) 
 
 Less apparent, though still publicly disclosed, is the 
true state of facts (the “Y”) for Pacific Breeze LLC and its 
vessel, revealed through emails sent by K.Y. Hwang of 
Dongwon Industries and obtained by Moore via FOIA 
requests. (Notably, these emails also support the true state of 
facts for Majestic Blue LLC and its vessel.) In one email, 
K.Y. Hwang informs the recipient that he is “from Dongwon 
Industries” and is “in charge of care for F/V Majestic Blue & 
Pacific Breeze.” (App. 608.) He writes that he has received a 
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message from the LLCs’ general manager and that he is 
worried about the looming expiration of the vessels’ SPTT 
licenses. In a second email, addressed to the LLCs’ general 
manager, he states that “[w]e [Dongwon] are studying the 
possibility of our US flagged fishing vessel’ [sic] operation in 
Atlantic Ocean.” (App. 609–10.) Relying on these emails, 
Moore itself alleges in its complaint that “[c]learly, 
Dongwon, rather than any U.S. Citizen, maintained 
operational control over the LLCs and made all major 
decisions for Majestic Blue and Pacific Breeze.” (App. 47.) It 
further contends that “[b]y Dongwon’s own admission [], the 
Vessels are part of Dongwon’s ‘US flagged fishing vessel 
operation’ and were not really owned or controlled by U.S. 
Citizens despite Defendants’ contrary certifications to the 
U.S. Government.” (App. 48.)     
 
 In sum, we have little difficulty concluding that the 
transaction setting forth the alleged fraud was publicly 
disclosed via the two news articles and the FOIA documents.  
 
IV. Original Source 
 Moore can nonetheless clear the bar if it qualifies as an 
“original source.” The post-PPACA bar defines an original 
source as one “who has knowledge that is independent of and 
materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or 
transactions.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012). In support of 
its case for original source status, Moore relies on information 
that it obtained from discovery in a federal civil case. In June 
2010, the F/V Majestic Blue sank in the South Pacific, 
resulting in the death of its captain, David Hill. Moore 
represented Hill’s wife in a wrongful death action in federal 
court against Majestic Blue LLC and Dongwon. In discovery 
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in that litigation, Moore obtained documents and deposed 
individuals including K.Y. Hwang, and Joyce Kim and Jayne 
Kim, the LLCs’ sole shareholders. From this discovery, 
Moore not only first learned of the alleged fraud but also 
uncovered details as to how it unfolded. Moore argues, as it 
must, that this information that it obtained in the wrongful 
death action is independent of, and materially adds to, the 
publicly disclosed transaction of fraud. We agree.    
 
 A. Independent of 
 The District Court held that Moore was not an original 
source because the information that it had obtained through 
discovery in the wrongful death action did not constitute 
“independent knowledge.” In doing so, it analyzed Moore’s 
knowledge according to our jurisprudence under the pre-
PPACA bar whereby we had required that a relator’s 
knowledge must be independent not just from information 
that qualified as a public disclosure under § 3730(e)(4)(A), 
but also from information readily available in the public 
domain. See United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding 
Co., 473 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that while 
“reliance solely on ‘public disclosures’ under § 3730(e)(4)(A) 
is always insufficient under § 3730(e)(4)(B) to confer original 
source status, reliance on public information that does not 
qualify as a public disclosure under § 3730(e)(4)(A) may also 
preclude original source status depending on . . . . the 
availability of the information and the amount of labor and 
deduction required to construct the claim” (citation and 
quotation marks omitted)). Informed by this pre-PPACA 
interpretation, the District Court concluded that Moore’s 
knowledge was not independent because the information 
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obtained in the civil litigation was in the “public domain” and 
not “obscure.” (App. 23.)   
 
 Although the District Court was correct in interpreting 
our pre-PPACA jurisprudence, it erred in concluding that this 
interpretation of independent knowledge should also apply to 
the post-PPACA bar. As noted earlier, the pre-PPACA bar 
defined an original source as “an individual who has direct 
and independent knowledge of the information on which the 
[complaint’s] allegations are based.” 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(e)(4)(B) (2006). This definition does not indicate what 
the knowledge must be independent from and makes no 
reference to the public disclosure sources enumerated in § 
3730(e)(4)(A). Accordingly, we reasoned that the relator’s 
knowledge needed to be independent from information 
readily available in the public domain. See Atkinson, 473 F.3d 
at 522–23.   
 
 But the PPACA’s new definition of original source 
requires an entirely different analysis. An original source is 
now defined as one “who has knowledge that is independent 
of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or 
transactions.” 31 § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
This definition therefore states that a relator’s knowledge 
must be independent of, and materially add to, not all 
information readily available in the public domain, but, 
rather, only information revealed through a public disclosure 
source in § 3730(e)(4)(A).   
 
 Indeed, the text plainly requires courts to compare the 
relator’s knowledge with the information that was disclosed 
through the public disclosure sources enumerated in 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A). By using the definite article “the” before 
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“publicly disclosed allegations or transactions” in § 
3730(e)(4)(B), Congress has referred back to the public 
disclosures in § 3730(e)(4)(A). See New Oxford American 
Dictionary 1748 (2d ed. 2005) (defining “the” as a word 
“denoting one or more people or things already mentioned”). 
Congress also tied the definition of “original source” in § 
3730(e)(4)(B) to public disclosures in § 3730(e)(4)(A) by 
employing the identical phrases “allegations or transactions” 
and “publicly disclosed” in both provisions. Compare 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012) (“The court shall dismiss an 
action . . . if substantially the same allegations or transactions 
as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed [in 
the following enumerated sources].” (emphases added)), with 
id. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (defining original source as one “who has 
knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the 
publicly disclosed allegations or transactions.” (emphasis 
added)); cf. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 
457, 471 (2007) (deciding that the word “allegations” that 
was used in both § 3730(e)(4)(A) and § 3730(e)(4)(B) of the 
pre-PPACA bar meant different things because § 
3730(e)(4)(B) did not also refer to “transactions” and “[h]ad 
Congress wanted to link original-source status to information 
underlying the public disclosure, it would surely have used 
the identical phrase, ‘allegations or transactions’”).10   
                                              
10 It would also make little sense to apply our interpretation of 
“independent knowledge” under the pre-PPACA bar to the 
post-PPACA bar. In addition to “independent of,” “materially 
adds to” modifies “the publicly disclosed allegations or 
transactions.” So if “the publicly disclosed allegations or 
transactions” included not just public disclosures under § 
3730(e)(4)(A) but also other information in the public 
domain, we would ask whether the relator’s knowledge 
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 Applying this new definition of original source to the 
information that Moore gained through discovery in the 
wrongful death action as to how Dongwon established and 
controlled the LLCs, information that we will describe in 
more detail below, we conclude that Moore possesses 
knowledge that is “independent of . . . the publicly disclosed 
allegations or transactions.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) 
(2012).  
 
 B. Materially Adds  
 Through the wrongful death action, Moore contends 
that it learned, and thus alleged, numerous details that 
“materially add[]” to the publicly disclosed transaction of 
fraud, as is required for the original source exception to 
apply. As we will describe in more detail below, Moore 
discovered information such as what specific individuals were 
involved in the alleged fraud and how they initiated and 
perpetrated the alleged transgression.   
 
 We have not previously interpreted “materially adds.” 
The word “add” means to “put (something) in or on 
something else so as to improve or alter its quality or nature.” 
New Oxford Dictionary, supra, at 18. And “material” is 
defined as “significant, influential, or relevant.” Id. at 1045. 
So to “materially add[]” to the publicly disclosed allegation or 
                                                                                                     
materially adds to that information in the public domain. This 
would often lead to circular inquiries. Here, for example, we 
would ask whether Moore’s knowledge that it gleaned from 
discovery in the wrongful death action materially adds to that 
same information.  
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transaction of fraud, a relator must contribute significant 
additional information to that which has been publicly 
disclosed so as to improve its quality.  
 
 The defendants concur with this definition but argue 
that Moore falls outside of it. Citing cases from other circuits, 
they contend that the information that Moore obtained 
through the wrongful death action merely provides additional 
details that are immaterial because they only support the 
transaction of fraud that was already publicly disclosed. See, 
e.g., United States ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 
805, 815 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding relator was not original 
source because he provided only additional background 
information to the publicly disclosed fraud). According to the 
defendants, because the essential elements of the fraud’s 
transaction were publicly disclosed in the news articles and 
the FOIA documents, Moore’s additional details as to how 
the fraud originated and transpired do not materially add to 
the publicly disclosed transaction of fraud.  
 
 Yet that cannot be the meaning of the term, for that 
would read out of the statute the original source exception. 
The exception, of course, comes into play only when some 
facts regarding the allegation or transaction have been 
publicly disclosed. The salient issue, then, is how to 
distinguish additional but immaterial information from 
information that “materially adds” to the publicly disclosed 
allegation or transaction of fraud.  
 
 Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirement is of some 
assistance. Under Rule 9(b), which applies to FCA actions, 
“[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” 
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Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 155 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). A plaintiff alleging 
fraud must therefore support its allegations “with all of the 
essential factual background that would accompany the first 
paragraph of any newspaper story—that is, the who, what, 
when, where and how of the events at issue.” In re 
Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Securities Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 
217 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In 
our view, this standard also serves as a helpful benchmark for 
measuring “materially adds.” Specifically, a relator materially 
adds to the publicly disclosed allegation or transaction of 
fraud when it contributes information—distinct from what 
was publicly disclosed—that adds in a significant way to the 
essential factual background: “the who, what, when, where 
and how of the events at issue.”11 Id.     
 
 Moore has satisfied that standard with certain 
information that it learned through discovery in the wrongful 
death action. Indeed, with this information, it has contributed 
significant, specific details that were not publicly disclosed as 
to how Dongwon surreptitiously established and controlled 
Majestic Blue LLC and Pacific Breeze LLC.    
   
 For example, based on the discovery that it obtained in 
the wrongful death action, Moore alleged that in 2008, 
Jawoong Kim, a former Dongwon executive and brother of 
the company’s chairman, approached his daughters, Joyce 
and Jayne Kim, who are U.S. citizens, and asked them to 
form U.S. LLCs to “buy” two fishing vessels from Dongwon. 
                                              
11 To be clear, this standard is intended to apply when a 
relator’s original source status is at issue at any stage of the 
litigation—not just at the motion to dismiss stage.  
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The Kim sisters then formed Majestic Blue LLC and Pacific 
Breeze LLC and assumed from Dongwon record ownership 
of the F/V Majestic Blue and the F/V Pacific Breeze. But the 
Kim sisters served only as straw owners of the two LLCs: 
they capitalized each LLC with a mere $50.00, and they knew 
nothing about the business operations of the LLCs, relying 
entirely on their father Jawoong Kim to manage the 
companies.12 
 
 Moore also alleged that Dongwon never actually 
“sold” the vessels to the LLCs. To “buy” the vessels from 
Dongwon, the Kim sisters signed agreements in which the 
LLCs agreed to pay $4.4 million for each vessel. Yet these 
agreements did not hold the Kim sisters personally 
responsible for paying the LLCs’ debt, despite the LLCs’ 
negligible capital. Nor did Dongwon take out a mortgage on 
the vessels. And neither the Kim sisters nor the LLCs ever 
paid any money to Dongwon for these vessels.    
                                              
12 In footnote 7 supra, we declined to say whether the podcast 
interview with Doug Pine qualified as “news media.” In that 
interview, Pine stated generally that two sisters with U.S. 
citizenship owned the LLCs and that their U.S. citizenship 
was being exploited by Dongwon. But even if the podcast 
qualified as news media, the specific information that Moore 
obtained in discovery about the Kim sisters and Dongwon is 
distinct from, and adds significantly to, the vague information 
disclosed by the podcast. Unlike the podcast, Moore’s 
discovery documents revealed the sisters’ names and their 
lack of knowledge about the LLCs; their father’s name, his 
affiliation with Dongwon, and his initiation of the alleged 
fraud; and details as to how the LLCs were structured and 
poorly capitalized.    
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 Moore further alleged that Dongwon created a fake 
“manager” of the LLCs to initiate the SPTT license 
application process. At one point, “William Phil,” who 
claimed to be the LLCs’ manager, emailed the National 
Marine Fisheries Service and the U.S. Coast Guard about 
obtaining the SPTT licenses. (App. 43.) “William Phil,” 
though, was “a pseudonym for three Korean nationals who 
are also employees of Dongwon who operated under the false 
name in order to sound more like an American citizen.” (Id.) 
In fact, Joyce Kim testified in a 2011 deposition that she had 
never even heard of him.   
  
 We conclude that this information added to the 
publicly disclosed information in a material way. While the 
information set forth in the two news articles and the FOIA 
documents publicly disclosed the basic elements of the 
fraud’s transaction (i.e, the “X + Y”), the information that 
Moore acquired from discovery in the wrongful death action 
added significant details to the essential factual background 
of the fraud—the who, what, when, where, and how of the 
alleged fraud—that were not publicly disclosed.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 Having alleged information that is independent of and 
materially adds to the publicly disclosed information, Moore 
is an original source under the post-PPACA public disclosure 
bar. We will accordingly reverse the District Court’s 
September 23, 2014, order dismissing Moore’s action insofar 
as that order applied to Moore’s claims arising under the post-
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PPACA FCA and will remand the case for further 
proceedings.13 
                                              
13 We note that there will remain pending in the District Court 
on remand the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim that the District Court did not rule 
on in light of its grant of the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion. 
